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Abstract. As formal methods come into broad industrial use for verification of
safety-critical hardware, software, and cyber-physical systems, there is an in-
creasing need to teach practical skills in applying formal methods at both the
undergraduate and graduate levels. In the aerospace industry, flight certification
requirements like the FAA’s DO-178B, DO-178C, DO-333, and DO-254, along
with a series of high-profile accidents, have helped turn knowledge of formal
methods into a desirable job skill for a wide range of engineering positions. We
approach the question of verification from a safety-case perspective: the primary
teaching goal is to impart students with the ability to look at a verification ques-
tion and identify what formal methods are applicable, which tools are available,
what the outputs from those tools will say about the system, and what they will
not, e.g., what parts of the safety case need to be provided by other means. We
overview the lectures, exercises, exams, and student projects in a mixed-level (un-
dergraduate/graduate) Applied Formal Methods course1 taught in an Aerospace
Engineering department. We highlight the approach, tools, and techniques aimed
at imparting a good sense of both the state of the art and the state of the practice
of formal methods in an effort to effectively prepare students headed for jobs in
an increasingly formal world.
1 Introduction
Verification is a fundamental engineering skill; the current surge toward autonomy and
increasingly intelligent operation of hardware, software, and cyber-physical systems has
changed how we need to apply, and teach, verification at the university level. Industrial
aerospace systems, including avionics, commercial aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS), satellites, and spacecraft, are being pushed toward design-for-verification, e.g.,
by Model-Driven Engineering [37,38,39,40,18,16], Fault Detection, Isolation and Re-
covery (FDIR) [5,14], and Runtime Verification [23,15,33,24]. “Nowadays, it is well-
accepted that the development of critical [aerospace] systems involves the use of for-
mal methods,” [1]. In addition to the obvious need to train verification engineers and
researchers developing new formal methods, we are faced with the need to train a wide
range of engineers with basic skills like understanding the outcome of a formal methods
analysis.
Through a mixed-level (undergraduate/graduate) course, we introduce students to
the fundamentals of formal methods, which we define as a set of mathematically rig-
orous techniques for the formal specification, design, validation, and verification of
? Thanks to NSF CAREER Award CNS-1552934 for supporting this work.
1 Additional materials are available on the course website: http://temporallogic.org/
courses/AppliedFormalMethods/
safety-critical systems, of which aircraft and spacecraft are the prime example. The
course explores the tools, techniques, and applications of formal methods with an em-
phasis on real-world use-cases such as enabling autonomous operation. Students build
experience in writing mathematically analyzable specifications from English opera-
tional concepts for real systems, such as aircraft and spacecraft. Together, the class
examines the latest research to gain an understanding of the current state of the art,
including the capabilities and limitations of formal methods in the design, verifica-
tion, and system health management of today’s complex systems. Students leave with
a better understanding of real-world system specification, design, validation, and ver-
ification, including why the FAA specifically calls out formal methods in certification
requirements such as DO-178B [21], DO-178C [20], DO-333 [19], and DO-254 [22].2
This course is intended to be a fun, interactive introduction to applying formal anal-
ysis in the context of real-world systems. We emphasize hands-on learning, through
the use of software tools in homeworks and projects. Students learn the real tools used
at NASA, Boeing, Collins Aerospace, Honeywell, Airbus, the Air Force, and others.
Students from all areas of aerospace engineering, electrical and computer engineer-
ing, computer science, and other engineering disciplines, are encouraged to enroll. The
course is cross-listed at the senior undergraduate/entry graduate levels and cross-listed
in the Aerospace Engineering (AERE) and Computer Science (COMS) departments at
Iowa State University and advertised in the Electrical and Computer Engineering and
Mathematics departments; students from Industrial Engineering and Mechanical En-
gineering have also enrolled in this elective. Aiming for broad appeal, all concepts in
the class are motivated chiefly through aerospace engineering applications; this shows
direct applications to those students in the Aerospace Engineering Department and pro-
vides interesting use-cases for other majors. Example applications in homeworks in-
clude many different aspects of automated air traffic management and designing for
autonomous operations of UAS.
Applied Formal Methods takes a safety case perspective [10,32,2,7,16]; in Aerospace
Engineering, a safety case enables flight certification by providing an explicit statement
of safety claims, a body of evidence concerning the system, and an argument, based on
the evidence, that the system satisfies its claims [31]. The major learning objective is
for students to be able to read and understand, contribute to, and design an engineering
system for being flight certified by a safety case, as this capability is now a general engi-
neering skill. Students have the opportunity to construct a safety case as a half-semester
final project for the course.
Learning Outcomes. Our central focus is to enable students to look at a problem, iden-
tify what we can verify, what information is needed to perform that analysis, how to
validate the verification setup, and how to place the results in the field, e.g., by identi-
fying what is now known, to what extent, and what is not known. Students learn to read
research papers in formal methods, identify the current state of the practice, critically
2 Note that the railway industry has comparable standards CENELEC EN 50126 [8], EN 50128
[9], and EN 50129 [11]; these govern applications of formal methods in industrial rail systems,
such as the success in verifying Paris’ fully automatic, driverless Métro Line 14 (aka Météor-
Metro est-ouest rapide) [3]. The course highlights railway, motor vehicle, medical, and other
applications of industrial formal verification.
analyze current capabilities and limitations of the available tools and techniques, and
effectively identify the inputs and outputs to verification, including what they really
mean with respect to industrial safety standards. We specifically emphasize learning
techniques for specification debugging and validation of mathematical models of sys-
tems. By the end of the course, students can identify what we can verify, and how; what
can’t we verify and why not; and what do we not have enough information to verify
(and what additional information would we need). To construct an effective safety case,
students must be able to recognize incomplete verification problems, identify ways to
complete them, and identify assumptions and risks to validation.
Specific Learner Objectives. Through hands-on experience with formal methods tools
and techniques, classroom discussions, homeworks, and projects students have the op-
portunity to learn to:
– Specify system requirements formally in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and Com-
putational Tree Logic (CTL).
– Specify systems as formal models, i.e., models in a formal semantics.
– Apply model checking to system models and LTL specifications to determine if the
models satisfy the specifications.
– Use tools popular in industrial verification labs, including explicit and symbolic
model checkers, and theorem provers.
– Evaluate real-world systems to determine appropriate formal methods to use in
their analysis.
– Evaluate system requirements, including determining if they are safety or liveness,
and performing basic specification debugging.
– Analyze and draw conclusions about real-world systems regarding formal proper-
ties, understanding their significance and the inherent assumptions and limitations.
– Explain the principles underlying formal methods for different types of system
analysis (e.g. design time versus runtime), the capabilities, and the limitations.
– Develop an understanding of the current state of the art and how to find formal
methods tools for real-world use cases.
Prerequisites. The course requires the mathematical maturity and experience with proof
structures covered in Calculus II (ISU MATH 166). Due to the cross-listing, the prereq-
uisite is a disjuction of the Aerospace Engineering course Computational Techniques
for Aerospace Design (ISU AERE 361) or the Computer Science Algorithms course
(ISU COMS 311); both have MATH 166 as a prerequisite. Students should be familiar
with first-order logic quantifiers and inductive proof techniques in order to understand
Theorem Proving; professor permission enables registration for students who learned
these skills in another 300-level course, e.g., from other engineering majors.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews
the high-level approach to teaching Applied Formal Methods, including course assign-
ments and examinations, highlights from the syllabus, and a general course schedule.
We specifically pull out the tools and techniques covered in class in Section 3. Further
details about the student research presentations and half-semester projects, including
group projects, appear in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 concludes with an
outlook toward continuous improvement of the course.
2 Approach Grade Component Weight
Homeworks and Projects 30%
Midterm 25%
Research Paper Presentation 15%
Evaluation of Other Presentations 5%
Final Project 25%
Fig. 1: The weight assigned to each compo-
nent: grades are assigned based on perfor-
mance on homeworks, projects, presenta-
tions, a midterm exams, and a final project.
The first half (55− 60%) of the course
is a survey of the formal methods using
modern tools, exemplified by case stud-
ies on industrial applications of formal
verification. Class sessions are largely in-
teractive and include discussions of the
readings, guest speakers from industry,
small group activities, and lecture. Stu-
dents are encouraged to participate ac-
tively in class sessions. Lectures commence with “Formal Methods Explained: what
are formal methods, why do we need formal methods, and why don’t we formally ver-
ify everything?” The course proceeds to briefly review propositional logic and proofs.
Class sessions cover in detail temporal logics, strategies for formal specification, spec-
ification debugging [27,28], system modeling, explicit model checking [29], theorem
proving [6], and symbolic model checking based on [25]. These are the topics covered
by the midterm examination, given during normal class hours, covering the material
from readings and homeworks from the first half of the course. The second half of the
course requires only two assignments: an in-class presentation of a research paper of
the student’s choosing, and a final project spanning the second half of the course, which
serves in place of a final exam. All students are required to present the results of their
final project mid-term and final results to the class and turn in a report including all
artifacts required for reproducibility of their results at the end of the semester during
the final exam period. Figure 1 summarizes the course assignments.
Fig. 2: The tree of Formal Methods, as pre-
sented in lectures; solid lines represent di-
rect variations whereas dashed lines repre-
sent related derivations.
Other formal methods are discussed
in class, included in in-class activities,
demos or videos, and readings. Classes
trace the relationships shown in Figure 2.
Homeworks and Projects. All home-
works are distributed and collected via
github classroom. Homeworks are re-
quired to be typed and formatted in
LATEX; some require submitting input
files, e.g., for Spin, NUXMV, or PVS,
solving the verification exercises. Stu-
dents may talk about the problems with
fellow students and the professor, but
must submit individually-drafted write-
ups. We occasionally discuss and work
through parts of homework problems or
variations thereof in class. When dis-
cussing with fellow students they must
strictly follow the “empty hands policy:” one cannot leave a discussion meeting with
any record of the discussion (hard copy or electronic). All scratch paper must be torn
and thrown away and all boards erased. Homeworks are encouraged to include BIBTEX
references sections, including credit to collaborators and outside sources consulted. Stu-
dents are encouraged to consult research papers, books, or other published materials in
accordance with the University Honor Code (which prohibits searching for answers on-
line, posting questions to internet forums, or discussing any assignments with others
on the internet). All solutions should be written in each student’s own words, even if
the solutions exist in a publication referenced in the homework bibliography. While we
adjust the course schedule every semester, depending on the students’ backgrounds and
the availability of guest speakers, a common schedule for the 16-week semester appears
in Table 2.3














HW 0 github classroom and LATEXfundamentals; due 2nd class period
HW 1 Propositional Logic: review of logic and proof structure; ∼1 week
HW 2 Temporal Logic: LTL and CTL; ∼1.5 weeks
HW 3 Classifying Specifications & Explicit-State Modeling in Spin; ∼2.5 weeks
HW 4 Explicit-State LTL Model Checking in Spin; ∼1 week
HW 5 Theorem Proving: exercises in PVS (or Isabelle); ∼1 week
HW 6 Symbolic Model Checking with NUXMV; ∼1 week
Midterm Comprehensive exam covering all homework topics in the 9th or 10th week
Presentation Choice of paper due concurrently with HW 6; research paper presentation
and peer evaluations during class periods after midterm
Project (P) Initial project proposal due immediately following midterm; mid-way pre-
sentation (MP) in front of the class 2-3 weeks later; final presentation (FP)
during the last week of classes; final paper/verification artifacts (Fin) due
during final exam period
Table 2: A typical schedule for the homework assignments/small verification projects
(top) comprising the survey of formal methods tools and techniques, along with the
independent-research-based course assignments (bottom) across a 15-week semester
with a following final exam period.
3 In the U.S., there is usually a one-week break in the second half of the semester, after the
mid-term project report presentations (Thanksgiving Break or Spring Break).
Reading Materials. Reading materials are included in the homeworks or otherwise dis-
tributed in class, e.g., research papers. There is no required textbook for this class. Two
optional textbooks provide supplemental materials for students who desire additional
reading, with the following caveats.
Optional Textbook: An Introduction to Practical Formal Methods Using Temporal Logic
[13]. Use this for:
– good background on LTL: well-formed formulas, semantics, encoding English sen-
tences, expressivity, normal forms, relationship to automata
– reactive system properties: safety, liveness, fairness
– specification and modeling of real systems
– deciding the truth of a temporal formula; related proof techniques including explicit
model checking
– thorough chapter on Spin, including how to run it from the command line and a
good Promela tutorial
– review of classical and propositional logic
– extensions including synthesizing software from specifications
Be cautious that:
– LTL is instead called PTL in this book; that is non-standard
– LTL2BA is not the best tool; SPOT is superior now: https://spot.lrde.epita.fr/
– URLs provided are outdated (no longer active or superseded by the state of the art)
– Spin chapter refers to outdated xspin (though only briefly)
Optional Textbook: Systems and Software Verification: Model-Checking Techniques and
Tools [4]. Use this for:
– supplemental material on temporal logics (LTL, CTL, CTL∗)
– background on automata as system models
– review of explicit and symbolic model checking
– reachability, safety, liveness, deadlock-freeness, fairness
– overview of modeling abstraction methods
– out-of-date chapters on SPIN and SMV still have useful reviews of basic tool usage
– ideas for related formal methods, including timed automata models, additional tools
Be cautious that:
– This book is extremely out of date!
– LTL is the proper name for Linear Temporal Logic (book calls it PLTL)
– comparisons of LTL vs CTL/CTL∗ have been changed/been disproved
– SMV version described is no longer available; current tool is NUXMV
– Spin version described has been updated (xspin vs ispin)
3 Tools and Techniques
While homeworks include hands-on projects in Spin, NUXMV, and PVS (or Isabelle),
several other tools and techniques are covered in lectures, demos, or in-class activi-
ties. These tools, plus the most popular selections from student-devised projects, are
collected in Table 3.
Spin Model Checker http://spinroot.com/
 V
SPOT Produces Our Traces https://spot.lrde.epita.fr/
T V (Optional for use in Spin-related homeworks)
NUXMV Model Checker https://es-static.fbk.eu/tools/nuxmv/
 V
PVS Theorem Prover http://pvs.csl.sri.com/
 (OR Isabelle) V
Isabelle Theorem Prover https://isabelle.in.tum.de/
 (OR PVS)
PRISM Model Checker http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/
T V
Z3 SMT Solver https://github.com/Z3Prover/z3
T V
R2U2 Runtime Verifier http://temporallogic.org/research/R2U2/
T
Dafny Language and Program Verifier http://rise4fun.com/dafny/
T
CBMC (Bounded Model Checker for C and C++ programs) http:
//www.cprover.org/cbmc/
T V
Coq Proof Assistant https://coq.inria.fr/ [Book: Formal Rea-
soning About Programs http://adam.chlipala.net/frap/]
T V
Legend:
 Required in homework assignments & covered thoroughly in class
T Featured in in-class instruction or presentation by guest lecturer(s)
V Utilized in student-selected final project(s)
Table 3: Tools featured in different areas of the Applied Formal Methods course.
The first half of the semester (before the midterm) lectures are predominantly taught
with a combination of slides and in-class exercises, frequently involving the class break-
ing into two or three groups, each with their own whiteboard, and solving problems
in competition, usually in the form of a game. Groups must convince the rest of the
class of the correctness of their answers to receive game points. The winning team is
often awarded a prize like NASA stickers or similar swag from a guest speaker. Some-
times the same problem is posed to all groups, and sometimes each group is assigned a
different strategy to employ then discuss with the class. For example, lessons on tem-
poral logic encodings involve dividing the class by their personal preferences into an
LTL group, a CTL group, and an optional CTL* group (should anyone in the class
feel most strongly about that logic). During this Temporal Logic Showdown (based in
part on [35]), requirements in the form of English and/or figures (timelines, drawings,
flowcharts, etc.) are posed to the class simultaneously. The first group to correctly en-
code the requirement in their logic and buzz in wins the points for the round. After
that, encoding in the other logic (between LTL and CTL) earns half-points and the first
team to buzz during that round in has the chance to steal those points by completing the
correct encoding in the other team’s logic and buzzing in before that team.
4 Research Paper Presentations
Each member of the class presents a research paper in applied formal methods to the
class during the second half of the semester. A presentation consists of a slide presenta-
tion to the class covering the paper, and a discussion including the student’s own analy-
sis of its results. Students sign up for presentation times. The professor must approve all
papers selected. Students can choose their papers from a provided list of papers or from
a list of relevant publication venues. Alternatively, students may feel free to propose a
paper on applying formal methods from any source for approval. Students evaluate the
presentations of others for credit; anonymized summaries of the feedback of classmates
are included in each student’s evaluation. While the professor reads these evaluations,
presentations are graded by the professor alone.
4.1 Professor’s Presentation Evaluation Form
Students design their in-class research paper presentations according to the following
evaluation criteria. Point values are listed in JKs.
1. Did the presentation address the following aspects of the paper?
(a) J5K What was the motivation given for the work? What problem was being
solved or question was being answered?
(b) J5K What was the product of the paper? How was the paper novel and what
did it contribute to the field? What tools were used, problems were solved, and
artifacts were created?
(c) J5K Is the work in the paper reproducible,4 i.e. are all of the necessary arti-
facts available to redo the study, including any models, specifications, theo-
4 For further reference on how exactly to define reproducibility, correctness, and buildability,
please refer to: Rozier, Kristin Yvonne, and Rozier, Eric. “Reproducibility, Correctness, and
Buildability: the Three Principles for Ethical Public Dissemination of Computer Science and
Engineering Research,” In IEEE International Symposium on Ethics in Engineering, Science,
and Technology, Ethics’2014, May 23-24, 2014 [26].
rems, code, data, benchmarks, or other instruments used to complete the study
described in the paper.
(d) J5K Is the work in the paper correct, i.e. did the authors specifically address how
that they know their work is correct or provide any evidence of correctness such
as a proof or a comparison to known results?
(e) J5K Is the work in the paper buildable, i.e. is the foundation laid in such a way
that others in the future would be able to build on it, extend it, and utilize the
results in a meaningful way to accomplish a different project?
(f) J5K Is there future work? This can include both future work listed in the paper
and ideas the student has for extending the work.
2. J10K Did the presentation accurately overview the paper and the work presented
therein, given the time limit? Did the student make an effort to fully understand the
material and explain, if some piece is missing or not understandable, why that is
the case?
3. J20K Was the presentation clear? Did the student make an effort to present the
materials clearly and instructively, not necessarily in the order of the paper? Did
the student draw on additional sources to fill out the information and background
knowledge required to understand the paper? Did the student draw figures or cre-
ate ways of presenting the material clearly and fully aside from simply pasting in
artifacts from the paper?
4. J15K Did the student adequately cover background information and related work in
an effort to enable him/herself as well as the class to understand the material being
presented? Examples of doing this well might include the student reading and in-
cluding material from some of the paper’s citations or manuals for the tools used
or otherwise including related background information to aid understanding of the
material presented in the paper. These papers are short (usually about 15 pages)
snapshots of single projects in formal methods and are meant to be read by practi-
tioners familiar with the field and so usually do not include sufficient background
information in the main text.
4.2 Student’s Presentation Evaluation Form
Peer evaluations earn students participation credit and provide good feedback that is
summarized, anonymized, and returned to their peers. Point values are listed in JKs.
1. J2K What did you learn today? List at least three things you took away from today’s
class material.
2. J1K Was the presentation clear? What did you like about the way your classmate
explained the materials to you? What constructive suggestions do you have to of-
fer this classmate about how to present the material more clearly? (Your response
will not be passed on to your classmate, however, an anonymized summary of all
suggestions may be presented in class at the professor’s discretion.)
3. J1K Was the content of the paper useful? Do you think the authors have contributed
something that you or others might use or build upon in a future foray into formal
verification? Why or why not?
4. J1K Is today’s paper/formal method/topic something you think would be useful to
examine in more depth in this class? Why or why not? Some paper topics may
be covered in more depth following student presentations in the upcoming weeks;
some may be earmarked for updating this class the next time it is taught.
5 Student Projects
In lieu of a final exam, students complete half-semester projects demonstrating their
knowledge of applying formal methods. The high-level concept is simple: pick a sys-
tem, pick a formal method, and successfully apply that method to that system. Stu-
dents may work in groups of size one, two, or three. They are encouraged to discuss
their proposal with the professor early and often; a formal project proposal is due
mid-semester. Weekly progress reports, and a mid-term presentation to the class en-
sure steady progress while encouraging them to name their verification challenges and
bring them up for discussion in class.
5.1 Initial Project Plan: Statement of Work
For the initial project plan, each person/group submits a statement of work that specifi-
cally addresses the following questions:
1. Define your group. Who are the members of your group? What is your group name?
2. Define the parameters of your project. What formal method are you using? What
specifications will you verify? What system will you analyze?
3. What does a success look like for your project? For example, a successful model
checking project will be able to demonstrate a system model, validation of that
model, a set of temporal logic specifications, a set of model checking runs check-
ing the specifications against the model, and an analysis of the results. A success-
ful theorem proving project will be able to demonstrate a set of (validated) theo-
rems that automatically prove in an automated theorem prover and an analysis of
the results of the proofs. A successful project in runtime monitoring will be able
to demonstrate a set of specifications, a set of runtime monitors constructed from
them, experimental results over many system runs demonstrating correct operation
of the runtime monitors, and analysis of the results.
4. How will you demonstrate your analysis? In other words, answer all of the follow-
ing questions that relate to your project:
– What benchmarks will you use? Where will you get them from?
– How will you demo your analysis (in the class?) (in your final report?)
– How will you measure your results?
5. Remember to think about important logistics and organization elements. Each per-
son/group will collaborate via a git repository shared with the professor. What will
be the structure of your repo? How often should members check point models/spec-
ifications/documentation elements? If the project is a group project, how will the
group coordinate? For a group, when will group meeting be? For a single-person
project, what time have you scheduled each week to work on the project?
6. Provide a project timeline: for each week, list what you plan to accomplish that
week. Be realistic and make backup plans! Your group will email the professor
a (short) report at the end of each week with a project update according to your
weekly plan. This email can be as simple as a statement that all tasks were accom-
plished that week, or as complicated as a detailed explanation why something did
not work and how you have replanned to do an equivalent task. Weekly reports are
due at 5pm on Fridays. This is your chance to get feedback on your progress and
questions every week!
5.2 Progress Report and Preliminary Results
Provide a preliminary report from your group in the form of an in-class presentation of
your results-so-far, making sure to explicitly answer the following questions:
– What parts of your project have you completed? Provide a bulleted list of work
outputs to date.
– Provide an outline of your final report. What will the format be? What sections will
you include? How do you plan to present any data and your analysis?
– What challenges have you encountered so far and how do you plan to overcome
them? Provide a bulleted list of pairs {Challenge, Plan for action} to answer this
section.
– Do you think you will need to change/modify/add to your project in any way?
If so, make your case here. For example, if you have discovered that all of your
specifications fail when analyzed against your system, what is your plan to modify
the system and/or specifications?
5.3 Final Report and Presentation to the Class
Each person/group presents their project and results to the class during the last class
periods, The time slots vary according to the size of the group. The final report from
each person/group is due during the scheduled final exam period. The final report fol-
lows the outline and format described in the preliminary progress report. It includes the
deliverables listed in the initial project plan/statement of work. Specifically, students
should make sure to include the following:
– An abstract: succinctly summarize the final project setup and results.
– All models, specifications, code, or other artifacts needed to reproduce the work and
re-run the verification tasks you completed for the project. The professor must be
able to re-run the verification procedure(s) followed.
– Overview of the project including introduction, motivation, problem setup, and
other information needed to understand the problem domain.
– Related work and background information, citing any resources used in the design
and completion of this project.
– How was validation performed?
– What precisely was verified? What does it mean? How are the results significant?
– A complete verification analysis: results, performance of the tool(s) used, etc.
– A bibliography; Chicago Manual of Style (CMS) format is preferred.
The final report is cumulative; it needs to include all work done for the project in a
complete report. Failure to include any of the required sections listed above results in
losing points, even if the work was mentioned in class or in a presentation.
5.4 Example Student Projects
Students are encouraged to design final projects involving real-life systems of personal
interest. Many students choose to form a project from the verification component of
their graduate or undergraduate thesis research, or of a senior design or club project,
such as creating a safety case for the launch of a student-designed CubeSat. Other pop-
ular categories of projects include designing tools to create instances of a game the
student enjoys or to play such a game. Verification of autonomous driving or security
scenarios from popular media, and “classic” projects (like verification of an elevator
or traffic light protocol) have been proposed every semester. A competitive project cat-
egory has emerged where two or three students all verify the same system from the
same initial specification using a different favorite verification tool akin to an extended
version of the VerifyThis5 competition, with additional creative judging criteria.
Table 4 collects brief descriptions of student-designed final projects; in all cases,
the size of the expected final deliverables scaled linearly with the number of students in
the group and was adjusted for undergraduate vs graduate status. Several of the projects
changed from the initial project proposal as the students ran into unexpected road blocks
or discovered new tangents worth pursuing. Changes often stemmed from negative vali-
dation results, and ranged from minor adjustments in scope to major changes in the tools
used (e.g., after being able to prove a construct could not be expressed in one tool), or
problem objective. Accordingly, many of the final reports include thoroughly-explored
negative results.
Project description # U/G Tool(s) used
Verify a lane-keeping module for autonomous cars. Starting with
a road line detection algorithm, design a correct control algo-
rithm, verify safety requirements using KeymaeraX and software
implementation via CBMC, and validate including with real-
world testing via augmenting the student’s own car.
1 U KeymaeraX,
CBMC
Analyze a real system (the CySat Make to Innovate (M:2:I) un-
dergraduate research project) under active development spanning
multiple abstraction layers on a demonstration mission toward
surveying near-Earth objects under NASA’s CubeSat Launch Ini-
tiative. Software and hardware verification that the ISU-designed
flight computer meets mission reliability requirements.
1 U Spin,
NUXMV
Generate attack graphs (structures representing all attack scenar-
ios that an attacker can launch on a system) via a model-based ap-
proach with components/behaviors/defences/vulneratbilities and
specification of security/resiliency properties. Iteratively model-
check, disjuncting the previous counterexample to the current se-





Model the ZigBee wireless protocol along with a collection of
possible faults using OCRA for component based modeling,
contract-based design and refinement, NUXMV for model check-





Use Spin to generate winning strategies for the Kartenspiele card
game after a failed attempt with PVS.
1 G Spin, PVS
Create a python library to parse mission-time linear temporal
logic (MLTL), create an explicit state-space graph of a formula,
display this with graphviz, and find a satisfying path through the
graph, comparing two different search algorithms.
1 G N/A
5 https://www.pm.inf.ethz.ch/research/verifythis.html
Model a set of self-driving car intersection navigation scenarios
and driving paths; use symbolic model checking to verify that the
car always chooses a safe path. Generalize this to a maze solver,
replicating previously-published experiments with TuLiP. Solve




Define the formal operational semantics for a Simply Typed
Message-passing Calculus (STMC) for software concurrency.
Machine-checked proofs demonstrate the correctness of the mes-
sage passing model including broadcasting, multicasting and
guarded receive, and show the utility of the calculus by prov-
ing the properties guaranteed delivery of messages, the happens-
before relation between the various actions, and the mover prop-
erties of the possible actions.
1 G Coq
Formally analyze three security protocols Needham-Schroder
Public Key Protocol, Otway- Rees Protocol and Kerberos Proto-
col. Analysis of a protocol is targeted towards detection of attacks
in the protocol and suggestive modifications to the protocol that
can eradicate the attack detected.
1 G NUXMV
Two students compete to verify the same Traffic Alert and Colli-
sion Avoidance System (TCAS) [34]: will explicit model check-
ing or symbolic model checking be the better formal method for
this task? One employs Holzmann’s suggestions for optimizing
the Spin model, the other takes advantage of NUXMV’s newer
back-end search algorithms. The competition includes perfor-




Verify a python implementation of an A*-based pathfinding al-
gorithm for a robot avoiding obstacles to traverse a maze via
a shortest path using Linear Temporal Logic MissiOn Planning
(LTLMoP). Validation included representing the same model in




Explore the level of privacy maintained by users despite datamin-
ing, first through replication of a study on formal verification of
privacy constraints on loan applications, then by devising a scal-
able model of e-voting machine data with user-specified privacy
settings. An unsuccessful venture in Coq was followed by a suc-
cessful re-imagining of the project using NUXMV.
3 U2/G NUXMV,
Coq
Compositionally verify an autonomous drone racing system
with dissimilar components: localization (PVS), path planning
(mCRL2). and the high-level architecture (Belief-Desire-Intent
programming in AgentSpeak using Jason, Spin). Each student
leads the verification of one subcomponent; ultimately the effort




Three students compete using three different tools to solve the
same verification challenge (a Rubik’s cube) and compare their
results, performance, and which parts of the problem were eas-
ier/harder with each tool; creative methods of cross-validation
took advantage of overlap between tools, e.g., NUXMV and Min-
iSat. Models started with 2x2x2 cubes and scaled the difficulty







Model and verify a realistic subsystem of UTM (UAS Traf-
fic Management) for near mid-air collision (NMAC) avoidance
based on [17,12,36,30]. Use NUXMV to verify preflight, enroute,
and emergency situations; further explore properties of enroute





# Number of students in the group
U All students in group are undergraduate students
G All students in group are graduate students
Table 4: A representative selection of student-devised final projects, 2015 – 2018.
6 Conclusions and Outlook
In post-course surveys, students overwhelmingly identified details of tool use to be the
aspect of the course they struggled with most; this includes the challenge of exposure to
multiple new modeling/specification languages, details of tool installation/setup/debug-
ging, and the gap between the level of detail required by formal methods tools versus
their previous experiences, e.g., with pencil-and-paper proofs and informal (or no) sys-
tem requirements. The majority of students identified the theorem proving tool (either
PVS or Isabelle) as the most difficult to learn. When asked in hindsight (a year or more
after course completion) what aspect(s) of the course turned out to be most useful,
nearly every part of the course was listed by some student. The course project and the
survey of formal methods were each identified by over half of the former students as
most useful, citing in particular the perspective gained through experience. Other popu-
lar responses include the students’ sound theoretical understanding of formal methods,
the comparative discussions of specification languages, and in-class exercises (which
some students felt so strongly about they questioned the ability to scale the course to in-
clude more students or online students). Several students particularly appreciated learn-
ing about the (ab)use of SAT solvers for a variety of applications including scheduling,
specification debugging, and reduction of other problems to SAT. Nearly every student
surveyed, both during the course and in hindsight, wrote an impassioned essay about the
paper presentation section of the course, including the value of individualized feedback
from the professor and other students, the opportunity to improve their analysis/presen-
tation skills, exposure to the breadth of research frontiers and case studies in formal
methods, the perspective they gained on verification in the wild, and the ability to steer
the topics of the second half of the course to match the class’ interests.
When asked how the course could be improved, students have overwhelmingly fo-
cused on small details of individual exercises; this feedback is continuously used to
improve lectures, slides, and assignment descriptions. Examples include more in-class
demonstrations of the quirkier aspects of tools, more details on industry standards re-
quiring formal methods, and more information on community resources such as the ac-
tive mailing lists for many tools, especially Isabelle and PVS. Students have requested
add-on or follow-on courses such as a research paper reading group that offers an ex-
panded version of the paper presentation portion of the class, and a large-scale applica-
tion option where students work in groups to verify a real system over a whole semester
simulating an industry setting. This is consistent with the most-requested course im-
provement: each semester students request more information on the end-to-end formal
verification process, such as a universal flow-chart with all of the aspects of verification
from initial conception to system maintenance laid out in fine detail.
Applied Formal Methods is currently taught as an elective; it counts toward one
required technical elective for undergraduate and graduate students in Aerospace Engi-
neering, Computer Science, and Computer Engineering, and has (so far) always been
approved for replacing technical electives in other areas of engineering. Going forward,
we look to integrate it as a required course in a track, e.g., in an avionics or intelligent
systems concentration or minor within aerospace or in a cybersecurity or other inter-
disciplinary major. At its current size of 12-20 students per semester, the high level of
participation and multiple presentations by each student in the course is both practi-
cal and advantageous: each student can participate actively in the course and receive
personalized instruction in applying formal methods to a project tailored to her/his in-
terests. Maintaining learning outcomes while potentially scaling the class to a larger
size will be a formidable challenge. End-of-semester student ratings of the course have
been consistently very high; if the course becomes required instead of purely elective,
some adjustments may have to be made to accommodate a broader audience with more
diverse interests.
One goal of publishing materials on the course is to receive feedback that can lead
to continuous improvement; another is to open course materials for others to use and
build upon. As formal methods teaching at the undergraduate and beginning graduate
levels becomes more widespread there may be enough materials across the teaching
community to support a tool-wise central repository of exercises, exam questions, and
other teaching resources. We hope to contribute to such a repository, especially for tools
like NUXMV and Spin, which remain popular for student use. Such materials could
also be used to create industrial courses, such as the PVS Course at NASA Langley
research center. We are continuously looking for industrial guest speakers to visit or
give virtual lectures on their experiences applying formal methods in industrial practice.
Traditionally, these lectures have received rave reviews and resulted in extra students
showing up to class, in addition to those enrolled in the course. We hope to build up a
club of regular industrial guest speakers as well as new lecturers to continue to inspire
future students to apply formal methods in practice.
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